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Abstract
The combination of perdurantism and presentism has an alleged nice ad-
vantage: it seems to avoid the ‘no-change objection’ to four-dimensionalism 
(non-presentist perdurantism). The purpose of this paper is, firstly, to argue 
that this is not true, and that the ‘no-change objection’ applies to presentist 
perdurantism with as much strength as it applies to four-dimensionalism, and 
secondly, that there are additional difficulties with this view, mainly due to 
the claim that wholes can have parts that don’t exist.
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§1 The perdurantist’s central claim is that ordinary material objects are aggre-
gates of temporal parts and that they persist (perdure) from one time to another 
by having different temporal parts at different times. These temporal parts are 
‘time-bound’, that is, they don’t exist at more than one time (or time-span, if 
they are temporally extended). Aggregates of temporal parts (ordinary material 
objects, people, …) of course can and do exist at more than one time, but only 
by having numerically distinct temporal parts at different times. Perdurantism 
can be combined with two views about time: eternalism and presentism.
Eternalism is the doctrine about time which takes all times to exist, and 
to be ontologically on a par – there is no ontological difference between past, 
present and future times. As Ted Sider puts it: “Just as distant places are no less 
real for being spatially distant, distant times are no less real for being temporally 
distant” (Sider 001, p. 11). Thus, past and future objects exist, just as present 
objects do. The present time and presently existing objects have no ontological 
privilege, and “now” is an indexical term just like “here”.
1 For very helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper, I would like to thank Fabrice 
Correia, Gianfranco Soldati, David Stauffer, as well as two anonymous referees of Sats. 
 This is the perdurantist ‘worm view’. I will discuss the ‘stage view’ in §3. 
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Contrary to eternalism, presentism claims that only presently existing objects 
are real – “to exist”, then, amounts to “to exist now”. Typically, presentists are 
also ‘serious tensers’ drawing an important distinction between saying that 
past objects once existed and future objects will exist but only current objects 
exist. One could think, at a first glance, that presentism, thus formulated, is a 
non-starter – for how is one to understand the presentist’s central claim “The 
only things that exist are those that exist at present”? It seems there are two 
possibilities: either the first occurrence of “exist” in this claim is tensed or it is 
not. If it is, then it seems that presentism is an uninteresting truth (“The only 
things that exist now are those that exist at present”), and if it is not – that is, 
if “exist” is to be taken as a tenseless form of the verb meaning something 
like “existed, exist, or will exist” – then presentism seems to be obviously 
false. But even if it is perhaps not easy to formulate the presentist view in 
a non-controversial way, it certainly is not a ‘non-starter’ – what the view 
wants to claim is simply that there are fewer objects than those recognized by 
the eternalist. Thus, presentism is a thesis about what there is, as for instance 
Zimmerman puts it: “[T]here is only one largest class of all real things, and 
this class contains nothing that lies in the past or future. Presentism is, in fact, 
a thesis about the range of things to which one should be ontologically com-
mitted” (Zimmerman 1998, p. 10).
The combination of perdurantism and eternalism is traditionally called 
“four-dimensionalism”, and the combination of perdurantism and presentism 
can simply be called “presentist perdurantism”. It is the purpose of this paper 
to explore some aspects of this latter view, while comparing it to the four- 
dimensionalist one, and to argue that it falls prey to serious difficulties. 
§2 Let us consider the presentist version of perdurantism. Such a view claims 
that an object that exists at the present time doesn’t exist at that time in its 
entirety but exists there by having a present temporal part. Its other tempo-
ral parts, following perdurantism, exist at other times but, here comes the 
presentist’s claim, those other times don’t exist. But why claim that objects 
have temporal parts at other times than the present if these parts don’t exist? 
According to Berit Brogaard (Brogaard 000), this is the best way for per-
durantism to avoid what is, according to her, the main charge against it in its 
non-presentist form: that it entails a changeless world. Indeed, it is considered 
by many as a serious objection to the non-presentist version of perdurantism 
(four-dimensionalism) that it entails the denial of change in the world. The 
objection goes as follows.
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Let us consider my neighbour Cyrano. At some past time t1 he has a big 
nose. Suppose, then, that he undergoes a plastic surgery operation and so has, 
at a later time t, a small nose. What this amounts to, according to the four-
dimensionalist, is that one of Cyrano’s temporal parts has a big nose, and 
another has a small one. Thus, four-dimensionalists often take change to be 
very much like spatial variation since change is accounted for as the having 
of different properties by different parts. But when considering this account of 
change, some object to it by claiming that what we want to give an account 
of is how a single object, a single individual like my neighbour Cyrano, can 
change, and the four-dimensionalist is telling us a story about different objects 
(different temporal parts) having different properties, and this is not the story 
we wanted to be told. What we have is not change of an individual, but replace-
ment of one changeless object (one temporal part) by another changeless one. 
Instead of saying that Cyrano changed from t1 to t from having a big nose 
to having a small one, the four-dimensionalist says that the t1-part of Cyrano 
has changelessly the property of having a big nose and the t-part of Cyrano 
has changelessly the property of having a small one. Since Cyrano himself 
is unable to lose or gain any such properties, this is why there is no room for 
genuine change in the four-dimensionalist’s world. So, no concrete particular 
can ever genuinely change.
Brogaard claims that the presentist variant of perdurantism is capable of 
avoiding this objection: the t1-part of Cyrano comes out of existence, by the 
passage of time, while the t-part comes into existence, and is then, in turn, 
replaced by another temporal part, and so on – thus the four-dimensionalist 
view that “[a perduring object like Cyrano] has temporal parts with different 
properties, just as a multicoloured strip of paper has spatial parts with different 
properties, and neither case involves change in the sense in which this word 
is commonly understood” (Brogaard 000, p. 4) is avoided because there is 
no such ‘strip’. And since only one temporal part of Cyrano exists, namely the 
present one, the only properties instantiated are the properties instantiated by it 
now – there is no having tenselessly any property and there is genuine change 
in the world, for, as she puts it “[…] the coming into existence of a new stage 
[i.e. temporal part] with a different non-relational property is a real change 
– and this in a way that captures our most basic intuitions according to which 
a change has taken place if the object stage that presently exists has different 
properties from those that existed previously” (Brogaard 000, p. 48). 
 For statements of this objection see, for instance, Brogaard (000), Haslanger (00), 
Sider (001), and Simons (000). The origins of the objection seem to be found in McTaggart 
(197). 
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I do not see the force of this answer to the objection. Suppose that the 
‘no-change objection’ succeeds against four-dimensionalism. The core idea 
of the objection is that instead of having a case where an object genuinely 
changes in its intrinsic properties, we have a case where one object (one tem-
poral part) is replaced by another. Peter Simons, for instance, makes this claim 
when he says that the “four-dimensional alternative is not an explanation of 
change but an elimination of it, since nothing survives the change which has 
the contrary properties” (Simons 000, p. 65). Now, if this objection applies 
to four-dimensionalism, it obviously applies to presentist perdurantism as well 
– what we have, in the situation as described by Brogaard, is not one and the 
same object that would change any of its intrinsic properties, but a series of 
numerically distinct objects coming into and going out of existence, when one 
of them is continuously replaced by another. The objection, then, applies here 
with as much force as before. 
But perhaps the presentist perdurantist could claim that her view, but not 
the four-dimensionalist’s, can accommodate the claim that there is change in 
what exists – and this is perhaps why Brogaard thinks that it can answer the 
no-change objection. Indeed, the four-dimensionalist’s ontology is a static 
one since all times, past, present and future, equally exist, while the presentist 
component of presentist perdurantism allows for a world where what exists 
changes, since only the present time is real. But let us be careful about what 
such a claim is about: what we have here is that there is a difference in what 
exists, since the reality’s stock contains, for example, Cyrano with a big nose 
at some time, and does not contain such an entity at a later time. But how 
does such a claim answer the no-change objection? It doesn’t. It is true that 
the total reality’s stock is different from time to time – but such a claim turns 
out to be true even under four-dimensionalism, since the reality’s stock at 
some time is different from the reality’s stock at some other time. The only 
difference is that under presentist perdurantism the reality’s stock at a time is 
the reality’s stock simpliciter, but this could hardly provide an answer to the 
no-change objection – granted, the defender of such a view could claim that 
“reality’s stock simpliciter changes” but what else could such a claim mean, 
except, as we have seen, that the reality’s stock is different from one time to 
another? – which, again, is true even under four-dimensionalism. Furthermore, 
and most importantly, even if there were a difference between the two views 
with respect to a ‘change’ in what exists (the reality’s stock simpliciter), there 
certainly is no relevant difference in the account the two views provide of what 
we wanted to account for in the first place: intrinsic change of an entity such as 
Cyrano. Exactly as under four-dimensionalism, nothing (that is, no one thing) 
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undergoes intrinsic change under presentist perdurantism – what we have in 
both cases, to repeat the objector’s charge, is not change of an individual, but 
replacement of one changeless object (one temporal part) by another change-
less one. And the same goes, of course, for the world as a whole (the reality’s 
stock at a time) – the world is simply replaced by another, with the passage 
of time. It seems to me then that if the no-change objection succeeds against 
four-dimensionalism, it succeeds against presentist perdurantism as well. The 
diagnostic here is then that what causes trouble, according to the objector, if 
one wants a good account of change, is not the ‘eternalist half’ of four-dimen-
sionalism, but rather its ‘other half’: perdurantism. And so, it is not presentism 
(the rejection of eternalism) that can save the case of four-dimensionalism. 
To yield a satisfactory and intuitive account of change, the objector would 
probably argue, the cure is not presentism, but endurantism (that is, the rejec-
tion of perdurantism). 
§3 Let us turn now to an independent difficulty with the presentist perdurantist 
view that four-dimensionalism does not encounter. Remember: presentist perdu-
rantism claims that at the present time t1 an object such as Cyrano doesn’t exist 
in its entirety but exists there by having a t1-part. The perdurantist component 
of this view would push us to say that he also has the rest of his temporal parts 
existing at other times, but according to presentism, those other times don’t 
exist. But how is it possible to claim that material objects have temporal parts 
at other times than the present if these parts don’t exist? Of course, following 
presentism, one could say that they existed and exist no longer, but in what sense 
would they be parts of the object? The very plausible principle involved here 
was put forward by Trenton Merricks: “an object cannot have another object 
as a part if that other object does not exist” (Merricks 1995, p. 54). 
According to Sally Haslanger, this is in no way problematic to the holder 
of presentist perdurantism (see Haslanger 00, p. 11): her grandmother, says 
she, is part of her family even though she does not presently exist, so if her 
family can have a non-existent part, why couldn’t Cyrano? But such a line of 
‘argument by analogy’ does not seem to be of great support, since typically a 
family and a material object like Cyrano or a table are conceived as different 
kinds of entities; thus, they are not analogous cases, and so any argument based 
on an alleged analogy is misguided. In order to make this argument by analogy 
sound and persuasive, it would be necessary first to show that a family is best 
conceived of as a material object like a table, but Haslanger does not do that 
– and the burden of proof is on her, since one could very well plausibly argue 
that a deceased member of a family is not a part of it: a family is probably best 
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conceived of as a plurality, like a football team, and exactly as a football team 
can lose one of its members when this member ceases to exist, a family can lose 
a member in the same way, and in both cases the lost member is not a part of 
the team or the family anymore. So Haslanger’s example doesn’t prima facie 
seem to be a good one since the relation that family members or football team 
members bear to families and teams is a different relation than the parthood 
relation, and so this example cannot establish here that any non-existent object 
could be a part of anything existent, in the strong sense of “part” required by 
perdurantism – a doctrine according to which ordinary objects like tables are 
made up of temporal parts. 
Concerns about family members set aside, the main ontological difficulty 
here is that it really seems very hard to admit that the objects (temporal parts) 
that compose another object (the whole Cyrano) exist only one after another, 
and so fail to ever make up the whole, as they should. Cyrano is supposed to 
be an aggregate of his temporal parts, but there never is a time (or time-span) 
at which such an aggregate exists. 
Lawrence Brian Lombard thinks otherwise (see Lombard 1999). As he 
points out, rightly, one must carefully distinguish between two senses of “exist” 
if one is a perdurantist (both presentist and eternalist). First, the straightforward 
sense in which instantaneous temporal parts (let us admit here that there are 
such things, even if the perdurantist is not committed to them) exist at a certain 
time – if such entities exist at a certain time, they exist at this time entirely 
(they are three-dimensional entities) and they have all of their (spatial) parts at 
this time. Second, the derivative sense in which Cyrano, a whole composed of 
all of his temporal parts, exists at some time t – in this sense Cyrano exists at 
t in virtue of having a temporal part that does; but one is enough, he does not 
need to have all of his parts at t. Of course, it is the second, derivative, sense 
that is the interesting one for the perdurantist here, the first one being accepted 
by everyone: if there are any three-dimensional instantaneous entities, it is 
uncontroversial that they exist entirely at the time they do. 
Criticising Merricks’s claim that an object cannot have another object as 
a part if that other object does not exist, Lombard says that “what is obvious 
is only that an object that exists at a time t, cannot have, at t, another object 
as a part, if that other part does not exist at t. But what the perdurantist wishes 
to say is not inconsistent with that. […] What exists now in [the derivative] 
sense – [Cyrano] – is something that does (at some time or other) have parts 
that do not exist now; but what exists now in that sense does not now have 
those parts.” (Lombard 1999, p. 56).
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But let us consider a true statement like “Cyrano has a present temporal part, 
but he is not identical to it”. The problem here is simple: what is the referent 
of “Cyrano” and “he” in this statement? That is, what is this allegedly existent 
object that we are making reference to by these words? Does this object exist? 
Of course, it doesn’t – only a part of it does. Perhaps the presentist perdurantist 
would say that the other parts existed and will exist and that there is a sense 
in which we can speak about Cyrano composed of all of its parts – but such 
a strategy does not seem to be available here, since it would mean that one is 
taking seriously something like an extra-temporal standpoint from which one 
refers to an entity composed of different temporal parts existing at different 
times. The eternalist could do that, of course, but not the presentist, since doing 
this would be like considering the different times as equally real. It seems that 
the only thing the presentist can do is to see things from a standpoint of some 
determinate moment of time (the present) and from this point of view nothing 
that could be the referent of “Cyrano” is available. So, in what sense can the 
referent of “Cyrano” be said to exist? In reply, Lombard would probably say 
that it exists derivatively – but what does this mean here? In the presentist’s 
vocabulary, the ‘normal’ meaning of “exists” is “exists now” – only what ex-
ists at the present time ‘really’ exists; remember that presentism is a doctrine 
about what there is in reality’s stock, and that the doctrine claims that there 
is nothing more than the presently existing things. But now, the presentist 
perdurantist is telling us that there is more – that there is another, derivative, 
notion of existence according to which things composed of non-present (non-
existent) things exist. But, first, this seems to be a strong departure from one 
of the central claims of presentism to introduce two concepts of existence 
– one that sticks to the presentist view and another that does not seem to; and 
second, those two senses of “exist” are really distinct and irreducible one 
to the other. Compare to the case of the four-dimensionalist: she also uses 
two senses of existence, the ‘ordinary’ one, and the derivative, but here, the 
derivative sense does not carry any new ontological commitments – it only tells 
us that something can exist at a certain time by having a temporal part here, 
but it does not involve anything more than there already is in the first, non- 
derivative, sense of existence – so here, the derivative sense of existence is 
only a device to accommodate ordinary language, but nothing more. 
So, it seems that the notion of having non-existent parts seems to carry 
with it an ill-motivated plurality of notions of existence. But even if such 
notions of existence were to be accepted and endorsed, this would not leave 
the presentist perdurantist view cleaned of problems with the having of parts 
that don’t exist. 
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To see this, let us make a small detour and first consider another rescue 
mission that the defender of the presentist perdurantist view might want to 
undertake to answer the problem we had: that the temporal parts that compose 
an object exist only one after another, and so fail to ever make up the whole 
– and so it seems that Cyrano never really exists. Here is a remedy that is 
readily at hand: deny that Cyrano is a four-dimensional whole made up of 
temporal parts, and claim, rather, that he is an instantaneous temporal part 
which persists through time by having other temporal parts at other times as 
temporal counterparts. This amounts to a rejection of the more traditional 
perdurantist ‘worm view’ in favour of the so-called ‘stage view’ – since ordi-
nary objects like Cyrano, according to this view, are the instantaneous stages 
rather than the worms made up of them. (This is the view defended by Sider 
(001).) It is not my purpose to discuss the stage view here; I only wish to see 
how relevant it is to the combination of perdurantism and presentism. And it 
is obvious that it has the nice advantage to answer our objection: if Cyrano is 
an instantaneous stage rather than a temporally extended worm, then there is 
of course no problem about having non-existent parts, since nobody claims 
that he has any, and there is no problem about how successive stages could 
make up a whole, since nobody really cares about the wholes (Sider claims 
that the wholes exist in addition to stages, but that these are not the ordinary 
objects we usually care about and quantify over – so at least the pressure on 
the presentist perdurantist becomes here much weaker). 
So isn’t there a good reason for the presentist perdurantist to become a 
stage theorist? I think not. Consider the claim that Cyrano has now a small 
nose, but he had a big nose before. The stage view provides a counterpart-
theoretic analysis of such a claim: Cyrano has now a small nose, but he has a 
past counterpart that has (had) a big nose. Now, what is needed for Cyrano to 
have such a counterpart? Two stages are counterparts iff they are related by the 
counterpart relation. The counterpart relation is a relation of similarity, some 
sort of spatio-temporal contiguity and/or continuity, and causality. Actually, no 
stage theorist (including Sider) says what exactly the nature of the counterpart 
relation is, but my point here is simply that whatever the counterpart relation is, 
it just cannot hold between different stages if one is a stage view theorist who 
wants to be a presentist as well. Take Cyrano at t1 with a big nose and Cyrano 
at t (the present time) with a small nose. These two different individuals are 
supposed to be counterpart-related. But how could they ever be? How could 
a non-existent individual (Cyrano at t1) bear any degree of resemblance and 
have any other (spatio-temporal and causal) relations to an existent flesh-and-
blood individual (Cyrano at t – the present time)? Nothing non-existent is 
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sufficiently similar and related to anything existent to be counterpart-related 
(if it makes sense at all to even speak about ‘non-existent things’). And gener-
ally, the counterpart relation will never hold between the two individuals (the 
two numerically distinct Cyranos) simply because there never is a time when 
the two individuals both exist – and so there never is a time when both relata 
of the counterpart relation exist. How could then the counterpart relation ever 
succeed in doing the job it promises if the relata that it is supposed to relate 
never both exist? Of course, one could say here that two individuals are coun-
terparts iff, if they were both present (that is, if they both existed), then they 
would be counterpart-related, but such a situation never is the case, and so 
the conditional here would always be vacuous4. In short then, the stage view 
does not really help the business of the presentist perdurantist because, even 
if it seems to answer the objection about parts that don’t exist, it immediately 
yields a different but parallel objection about counterparts that don’t exist.
And it is easy to see how this problem also makes trouble for the presentist 
perdurantist who wishes to maintain the worm view – exactly as different coun-
terparts need to be related by a counterpart relation in order to be counterparts, 
different parts of four-dimensional worms need to be ‘glued together’ in some 
way in order to make up the wholes that are the individuals we are interested 
in, like Cyrano. Finding such a glue (that is, a unification relation that makes 
the successive temporal parts of a single four-dimensional worm ontologically 
stick together) is not an easy task even for the four-dimensionalist, but for the 
presentist perdurantist, the task just seems impossible to be carried out. For 
what would such a glue relation be? Again, it might involve resemblance, or 
causality, or spatio-temporal contiguity, or something else – in fact, whatever 
serves the stage theorist to load his counterpart relation can serve the worm 
theorist as the glue. And so, of course, the same problems as those we have 
just seen with the stage view will appear for the worm view: how could one 
existent thing and one non-existent thing be glued together (if, again, I may be 
allowed to even say such a weird sentence)? That is, what kind of ontological 
glue would be needed in order to authorise that mereological composition 
takes place between a thing that exists and nothing? Perhaps one could propose 
here, as a remedy, to follow the line of almost all four-dimensionalists who are 
friends of the principle of an entirely unrestricted mereological composition 
(for independent reasons, mainly to avoid problems with ontological vague-
ness) – so that the glue relation might not be restricted at all. But however 
unrestricted, it certainly cannot be that unrestricted – unrestricted mereologi-
cal composition is restricted to existent things only, and any attempts to take 
4 This parallels what Lewis (1986, p. 8) says about modal counterparts. 
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away even this restriction would lead one to weird places where no sensible 
metaphysician (I hope) wants to go – like commitments to individuals made 
up of the top half of Cyrano’s body today, and all of the tropical fish of the 19th 
century, and three unicorns, and two fire-breathing dragons.
§4 In the light of the above, I cannot see a real motivation for the presentist 
perdurantist view, especially since, as we have seen, its allegedly good treatment 
of the no-change objection turned out not to be very satisfactory in the end. 
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